In Chapter One, I argued that a lie is an assertion that the speaker knows she does not believe, but nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a context that, objectively interpreted, represents that assertion as to be taken by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker. Given that understanding, I argued that the primary, distinctive wrong of lies as such does not inhere in their deceptive effect, if any, on listeners, but instead in their abuse of the mechanism by which we provide reliable testimonial warrants, a mechanism we must safeguard if we are to understand and cooperate with one another and to achieve our mandatory moral ends. Of course, many lies also cause or attempt wrongful deception, by violating the speaker's duty of care toward the listener not to cause or risk the formation (or confirmation) in her of a false belief. On many occasions, when lies are deceptive, the deceptive components may reasonably represent the most salient part of the wrong done to their victims. But, what I call "pure lies" need not involve deception or the intent to deceive. They need not even be false; a speaker may lie by asserting what she believes to be false yet, unbeknownst to her, happens to be true. 1 Yet pure lies, like deceptive lies,.abuse the mechanism of direct communication and threaten the basis of our testimonial trust with one another.
Lying and Freedom of Speech
In Chapter One, I argued that a lie is an assertion that the speaker knows she does not believe, but nevertheless deliberately asserts, in a context that, objectively interpreted, represents that assertion as to be taken by the listener as true and as believed by the speaker. Given that understanding, I argued that the primary, distinctive wrong of lies as such does not inhere in their deceptive effect, if any, on listeners, but instead in their abuse of the mechanism by which we provide reliable testimonial warrants, a mechanism we must safeguard if we are to understand and cooperate with one another and to achieve our mandatory moral ends. Of course, many lies also cause or attempt wrongful deception, by violating the speaker's duty of care toward the listener not to cause or risk the formation (or confirmation) in her of a false belief. On many occasions, when lies are deceptive, the deceptive components may reasonably represent the most salient part of the wrong done to their victims. But, what I call "pure lies" need not involve deception or the intent to deceive. They need not even be false; a speaker may lie by asserting what she believes to be false yet, unbeknownst to her, happens to be true. 1 Yet pure lies, like deceptive lies,.abuse the mechanism of direct communication and threaten the basis of our testimonial trust with one another.
In Chapter Three, I argued that similar considerations about the significance of speech to our personal intellectual development and to our moral agency undergird the view that legal regimes must offer strong protections for individual freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is an essential social condition for the development, maintenance, and full value of freedom of thought, and for the full and proper exercise of our moral faculties. For these reasons, I argued that freedom of speech is a fundamental human right and an indispensable precondition of a just social and political scheme. -Together, these two positions-the strong condemnation of lies as such and the derivation of freedom of speech from similar argumentative foundations-prompt questions about the legal regulation of lies. Does a strong commitment to freedom of speech preclude regulation of lies as such, as many have thought? Prima facie, the philosophical case I have sketched for freedom of speech suggests, to the contrary, that freedom of speech may not extend to deliberate misrepresentations of the speakers' beliefs. That case stresses the significance of opportunities to speak and hear sincere speech (as well as speech transparently used to pursue our other nontestimonial uses of communication). Deliberately insincere speech should not garner the same sort of respect because it does not participate, even at the fringe, in the same values as sincere or transparent speech. Moreover, if deliberate misrepresentations undercut the warrants we have to accept each other's testimonial speech, then we have reason to think that deliberate misrepresentations interfere with the aims of free speech culture. 2 They not only demonstrate a culpable indifference to the validity of the warrants offered to the particular listener, but they damage the rational basis supporting our testimonial practices, which~are crucial elements of a thriving free speech culture and fundamental components of a social environment that supports the moral agency of thinkers. If the wrong of the lie is as insidious as I have argued, that wrong supports a strong prima facie case for identifying and marking that wrong through the signal of legal regulation and for using some of the powers of legal regulation to rebuke (and perhaps deter) its occurrence. 3 Many commentators, as well as a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, however, judge that freedom of speech may pose a gem;ral and fundamental obstacle to the legal regulation of lies as such. This position, I will argue, is mistaken.
In identifying that mistake, however, my aim is not to advocate for the comprehensive legal regulation of lies. Rather, my more modest objective is to show that, theoretically, legal regulation of lies need not offend the important values protected by freedom of speech and, in particular, by the free speech traditions articulated within First Amendment jurisprudence. The theoretical point seems worth making both because of the seriousness of the wrong of lying and because our discussion of the moral complexities of its regulation seems stunted by a preoccupation with free speech worries.
Still, I stop short of direct advocacy of general legal regulation of lies for two reasons. First, although I am unconvinced that there is any intrinsic free speech problem with the legal regulation of lying, there are important pragmatic concerns about the potential for governmental abuse that might, in some circumstances, be unleashed by such regulation. These concerns are serious ones, although, as I will suggest, they may have been overstated. Nonetheless, that assessment is better made on a case-by-case basis and not on the basis of sweeping legal or philosophical arguments. Second, as I will argue in Chapter Five, I have strong reservations about the legal regulation of the pure lie with respect to personal, autobiographical speech. These reservations emanate from considerations about equality, fraternity, and toleration, however, and not from freedom of speech. Attention to these sorts of considerations has been missing from cultural and legal discussions, I suggest, because misplaced free speech concerns have dominated the conversation. Thus, showing the compatibility of free speech values with legal regulation of lies may not, on its own, make a comprehensive case for its constitutionality or desirability.
Clarifying the scope and limitations of free speech arguments would not only counsel greater attention to other values, but also has specific practical implications. It would suggest that our constitutional scrutiny of legal regulations of lies should be far more focused on the specifics of their design, namely whether the particular factual circumstances of their application raise credible concerns about government abuse. In addition, the argument I offer also suggests that the evidentiary standard for regulating lies, whether pure or deceptive, may permissibly be lowered. As I will argue, free speech concerns do not require, as a condition of regulation, any showing of actual deception, the risk of a deception of the audience, or the intention to deceive; that is, the defendant's lie need not have implanted or reinforced false beliefs)n the audience (or risked doing so).
. Hence, where legal regulation of lies is apt, it may suffice, without triggering constitutional alarms, to show that the defendant deliberately asserted what the defendant did not believe. This simpler standard could ease the burden of regulating lies by commercial actors and corporate entities, among others.
In what follows, I focus on deliberately advanced misrepresentations of the spe;kers' beliefs, excluding ambiguous cases such as spontaneous utterances that may be insufficiently considered to count as deliberate. I will also cordon off defensive misrepresentations offered only in response to intrusive or unreasonable inquiries or demands, ones that threaten reasonable privacy interests. I bracket these cases in part because as defensive acts, they may be insufficiently deliberate, but also because they may represent justified cases of misrepresentation. To put it in the terms introduced in Chapter One, intrusive, unreasonable (even if inadvertent) demands for private information may generate a suspended context in which listeners have no objective warrant to take the speaker's assertion to be sincere or true; more weakly, such circumstances may give rise to excuses. In any case, I want to start with clear cases of unprovoked, deliberate statements that a speaker offers to be taken as true and represents as her belief, but that, in fact, she believes are false.
While considering these issues, it may help to have specific examples in mind. Consider these: First, the regulation of the clearly deliberate, nonspontaneous, "autobiographical lie"-e.g., lies about one's personal characteristics or accomplishments in public, in private conversation, or on a website such as match.com or, as in the case of Lance Armstrong, in one's autobiography. 4 Second, the regulation of the expertlie outside the fiduciary context-e.g., a lie by an expert about matters falling within her expertise that may turn into a pure lie that violates no code of conduct when told outside an employment or fiduciary context such as a lie told by a doctor, lawyer, food professional, or plumber about a matter within her expertise in a book, an article, or party conversation. Suppose a chef opines at a dinner party that food safety regulations hhe become overly rigid and falsely insists that one can safely leave potato salad out all day or a plumber falsely declares her conviction that organic products work just as well as harsh chemicals at dissolving clogs. Their audiences may not believe what is said and may not believe that their speakers believe them, although the context is not a joking one. If these lies are somber'y offered yet not believed, they may serve as examples of pure lies that would not fall under standard regulations of deceptive speech.
Of course, such lies, as well as lies told in professional or commercial contexts, may often deceive listeners. They may also, therefore, be subject to regulation on the grounds that, when deceptive, lies may materially harm particular listeners. I put aside that possibility to focus on the pure lie as such, independent of any deceptive effects. My contention is that well-crafted regulation of such lies need not raise any First Amendment difficulties even absent evidence of deception or its likelihood. The pure lie may be a rare specimen, but establishing the consistency of regulating the pure lie with freedom of speech would thereby show that from a First Amendment perspective, deceptive lies could be regulated qua lie, even when evidence of their deceptive impact proves elusive.
Freedom of Speech
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision about free speech and autobiographical lies. United States v. Alvarez invalidated the Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute that attached criminal liability to falsehoods about one's service and awards in military service,5 on First Amendment grounds. 6 I have no wish to defend the Stolen Valor Act or its constitutionality, in particular. I focus on the case because it airs some of the most prominent free speech arguments against legal regulation. Also, by offering a concrete case, Alvarez helps to highlight which objections to legal regulation are more contingent, attaching to a specific method of regulating lies.
The case arose from the following event. At a water district board meeting in Claremont, California, Xavier Alvarez, a board member, falsely bragged that he was a retired Marine and a recipient of the Con- Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012 (overturning the conviction of a defendant charged with falsely representing himself as the recipient of the Purple Heart).
gressional Medal of Honor. These claims were neither approximations of the truth nor understandable spontaneous exaggerations. They were fabrications from whole cloth. Indeed, Mr. Alvarez notoriously misrepresented himself, falsely claiming on other occasions to be a Vietnam veteran, a wounded member of the team that successfully freed [sic] the American ambassador during the hostage crisis in Iran, a police officer, and a professional hockey player. He was indicted under the Stolen Valor Act and pied guilty, while reserving his right to mount a constitutional challenge to the Act. His sentence included approximately $5,000 in fines, 400 hours of community service, three years of probation, and routine drug testing. 7 Alvarez challenged his conviction on the grounds that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First Amendment, and he persuaded both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 8 Although the Act did not specifically require the defendant to have a particular mental state as an element of liability (and some of the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court directed its criticism at legal regulation of falsehoods per se), 9 principles of charitable construction and constitutional avoidance would suggest the Act should be interpreted to attach liability only to deliberate falsehoods and not to accidental, unknowing, or good-faith mistakes of fact. 10 So interpreted, what made the Act interesting is that it did not tailor the regulation to contexts in which deception would be likely or the topic especially germane. Although it homed in on lies that were also factually false and bore on the speaker's military distinction, the Act did not restrict its coverage to particular fora of speech, such as representations to government officials, to the public, or within employment or commercial contexts. Thus, factors that might be significant to a duty against deception, such as the locale in which Mr. Alvarez spoke and his status as a board member were, strictly speaking, irrelevant to his liability to prosecution under the Act.
Thus, the Act took seriously what the Court had suggested in passing dicta multiple times over the years; namely, it endorsed the broad position that false (factual) speech as such has no First Amendment value arid so may be regulated for a legitimate purpose. 11 Despite the Court's e_x-tended flirtation with this broad position, when confronted with a statute predicated on this position, the Alvarez Court flatly rejected it as inconsistent with freedom of speech. 12 As I will argue, the Court stumbled here with respect to its analysis of lies.
Contingent Defects
Some of the Court's concerns in Alvarez revolved around serious defects in the Stolen Valor Act that, while important, do not represent intrinsic features of the legal regulation of lies. The Stolen Valor Act did not represent the epitome of well-crafted legislation. By attaching criminal penalties to pure lies, authorizing up to a year of imprisonment if the lie concerned certain distinguished medals, such as the Purple Heart, 13 the statute offended for its disproportionate remedy. 14 That charge, however, Moreover, the use of criminal penalties, even if proportionate, may exacerbate genuine concerns about selective prosecution and the selfcensorship associated with regulating the lie. 15 There is no question that it is troubling to enable the police, and the government more broadly, with a legal aven~e to prosecute activity that, it is alleged, most of the population has intimate familiarity with. 16 The concern is not, realistically, that mass prosecutions would transpire. Rather, the concern is with enabling government officials to threaten individuals who have garnered the government's disapproval with prosecution, a threat that could intimidate dissidents. 17 This is an important worry, and it suggests the wis'-dom of designing the legal regulation of lies with the primary motive of conveying a standard of conduct rather than deterring misconduct through powerful threats, regularly prosecuted. Using moderate civil regulations rather than criminal penalties might go some distance to address these concerns.
Of course, it is possible that civil regulations, too, may chill sincere speech. Crafting further safeguards might be required to arrest the potential for government abuse or its perception. This might be achieved by limiting the statute's applicability to repeat offenders, requiring multiple complainants, requiring strong proof that the defendant actively believed her statement was false ( 18 Some speakers may speak or act in ways that strongly suggest they do not believe a prior statement. Although that evidence may indeed be probative, in this domain it is important to rule out the possibility that the speaker harbored a contradiction in her beliefs of which she was unaware. The argument I am advancing for the regulation of lies does not to protect a reasonable expectation of privacy, allowing proof of government harassment to constitute a complete defense, instituting independent avenues for relief upon showings of illicit governmental motive, and incorporating sanctions for irresponsible accusations by civilians to forestall private harassment. 19 Such protections may be cumbersome, b~t I am not here exploring the adrninistrability of a permissible regulation of lying. I am just exploring whether regulations could be crafted without violating freedom of speech protections.
Another defect of the Stolen Valor Act was that, as crafted, it was not viewpoint-neutral, because it did not regulate all deliberately false speech or even all deliberately false speech relating to public service or one's wartime activities. The Act penalized misrepresentations about honored military service but, through omission, immunized misrepresentations about dishonorable military service, honorable diplomatic or Peace Corps service, activism protesting the war, or conscientious objection. This narrow focus of concern is in tension with the principle of R.A. V. v. St. Paul that the First Amendment demands that even unprotected speech may not be regulated for an impermissible purpose, namely a governmental determination that some viewpoints as such are privileged over others. 20 Important as the issues about abusive enforcement practices and clumsy drafting are, I want to put them aside. Largely, they are contingent objections to the particular version of legal regulation of lies embodied in the Stolen Valor Act and to its criminalization. To pursue the intrinsic free speech problems (if any} with the regulation of lies, we should tum our directly extend to include the legal regulation of self-deception, even culpable self-deception, a category that raises further issues about freedom of thought. 19 Greater creativity with agents of implementation and with the form of remedies might further alleviate anxiety. Regulation of insincere political advertising, for example, might be implemented through nonpartisan review boards, empowered to require that, for a specified period, offenders fund disclosures that their prior advertisements were found deliberately misleading. 20 In R.A. V., a hate speech statute was overturned on the grounds that although it could be construed to regulate unprotected "fighting words," it discriminated between different viewpoint-based categories of fighting words, penalizing discriminatory fighting words but immunizing antidiscriminatory fighting words. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84, 388-89, 391 (1992) . That interpretation of the statute at issue in R.A. V. was questionable, but the basic principle that a speech-discriminatory motive may not be deployed as the engine of regulation, even if it is targeted at otherwise regulable speech, has merit. See also Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 , 1228 (9th Cir. 2005 attention to a fair; well-designed civil statute that addresses a viewpointneutral range of deliberate misrepresentations offered in contexts that are clearly serious and nonfictional in presentation, and nonintrusive on reasonable domains -of privacy. Imagine that this scheme imposed high evidentiary standards, modest remedies, and safeguards to reduce the potential and the fear of government ab~se.
Would that (imagined) statute be consistent with freedom of speech? Do the Court's opinions in Alvarez give us reason to think not? Although the Court's majority divided between two opinions, 21 those two opinions convened on a number of putative free speech defects besetting the regulation of lies: first, regulations of lies are forms of content-discrimination, a First Amendment anathema that provokes skepticism and the highest standard of review; second, there is insufficient evidence that lying causes the sort of harm that could surmount free speech concerns; and, third, even deliberate falsehoods have free speech value. These arguments are all unpersuasive. ,
Content-discrimination

MUST REGULATION OF LIES BE CONTENT-DISCRIMINATORY?
To many free speech advocates, the prospect of regulating lies has seemed an immediate nonstarter because it is often framed as the regulation of speech on the basis of its content, a posture highly suspect and usually lethal from a freedom of speech perspective. 22 My contention is that this preliminary objection, though ubiquitous, is mistaken. When framed in a general way, the regulation of lies as such is not clearly a content-based regulation in the sense in which that pejorative classification is typically 21 Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion that garnered three additional votes;Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, also signed by Justice Kagan.
22 See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543-44 ("[T] he Constitution 'demands that contentbased restrictions on speech be presumed invalid ... '" (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,660 (2004) )). For a recent sustained analysis of the constitutional hostility to content regulation, see Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231 (2012) . The proponent of these regulations may object to this discussion on the grounds that the prohibition on content-based regulation generally applies to speech falling within the scope of First Amendment protection. Part of the issue here is whether deliberate misrepresentations fall within or outside that umbrella in the first place. I propose to lay that chicken-and-egg issue aside because, however accurate, the contention that they fall outside the First Amendment's protection requires an explanation. That explanation, to be persuasive, will have to engage with the concerns that drive the classification of regulations on deliberate misrepresentations as content-based, even if at the end of the argument one concludes that the prohibition does not strictly apply to this speech. meant. To regulate the lie is to regulate deliberate misrepresentation by a speaker: that is, it is to prohibit (or otherwise regulate) a speaker from presenting something she believes to be false as though she believed itto be true. The predicate of regulation is not that the content of the speeth is false. Recall, as I argued earlier, a statement may be true but still be a lie when the speaker disbelieves it. Rather, the predicate of the regulation is the conjunction of the speaker's mental state toward the content, namely that the speaker believes it to be false, and her presentation of that content, nevertheless, as though it were true and believed by her to be true.
One tip-off that this regulation is not really content-based is that if the same speaker or someone else uttered the same statement yet believed it (and that utterance possessed the same meaning), that speech would not fall afoul of the regulation. This suggests we are rather far from the standard stomping grounds of content-regulation.
Moreover, were we to regulate, our reason for regulating need not be content-based. The prima facie argument offered above is that the lie interferes with the aims and function of a free speech culture not through its content or through the reactions of the audience to its content, but rather because its serious utterance falsely represents itself as presenting the thoughts of the speaker and thereby misuses the exclusive tools we have to share our sincere beliefs with one another; in so doing, it scrambles and distorts the channels of communication deployed by the sincere. This impetus for regulation does not stem from disagreement with the content of the speech or from a worry about how others react to its content, but rather from the fact that insincere, but seriously presented, representations interfere with our ready, reliable ability to transmit our mental contents, whatever they may be, and have them taken as testimonial warrants of our beliefs. So, both our motives as well as the target of regulation seem compatible with valuing freedom of speech. Neither seems content-based. Indeed, such regulation may be partly motivated by an interest in protecting the reliability and the perceived reliability of speech; so understood, such regulations advance free speech values in ways analogous to time, place, and manner restrictions that aim to ensure that speakers can be heard and are not drowned out by competitors or hostile audience members. If lies interfere with the successful transmission of recognizable testimonial warrants and therefore with effective communication, regulations on lies may serve the values that underpin freedom of speech. Further, legal regulations of the lie need not have a content-discriminatory impact. As I go on to argue, regulating the lie need not chill, preclude, or burden valuable speech.
That's my general argument. To unpack it a bit, it may help to make some preliminary distinctions between the speaker, the proposition she utters (the meaning of the utterance), its truth-value, her attitudes and beliefs toward the proposition she utters, her motivation for producing the utterance, and the attitudes and beliefs she has toward her utterance. So, for example, Abby, the speaker, declares that "The brown dress no longer fits Sally," and thereby expresses that the brown dress once did but does not now fit Sally, Abby's daughter. Abby utters a true proposition, believes the proposition she utters, is unhappy about its content because its truth means a shopping venture is in her future, says it because a new outfit needs to be purchased, but is unhappy about uttering the proposition to Kristin, Sally's other mother, because Abby knows that airing this fact will bring some stressful financial pressures to the forefront of Kristin's consciousness. Without looking at Sally, Kristin insincerely replies, "The dress still fits her perfectly." She utters this insincere statement in order to deflect the social pressure to set a time for a shopping expedition and to repress the bubbling financial stress. Abby is angered by Kristin's utterance, both because of Kristin's insincerity and because Abby understands that Kristin is attempting to weasel out of mall duty.
Abby's anger toward Kristin's insincerity is a personal analog of a legal reaction to insincere speech. Abby is not deceived by Kristin's reply. She neither believes the dress fits nor that Kristin believes the dress fits. Abby reacts to Kristin's misrepresentation of her belief about the proposition she has uttered and to the reasons that give rise to the insincerity. Abby is not, however, upset about the content of Kristin's proposition per se. Abby would be thrilled were the dress to fit Sally. Further, were Kristin sincere (but incorrect), Abby might be bemused by Kristin's failure to notice the height of the hem or, in a darker mood, annoyed by her sartorial negligence. In these cases, Abby's reaction is to Kristin's motivations for her utterance and Kristin's beliefs about the truth-value of what Kristin utters, not to the uttered proposition's meaning. And, though some of her reaction is to Kristin's motive, it isn't entirely to Kristin's effort to avoid an unpleasant task. Had Kristin been forthcoming and said, "The dress is tight but I don't feel like being part of the solution," they could have had a direct, open conversation about the division and importance of their respective duties. Had Kristin been silent, Abby could have pressed her to engage the subject. But, by addressing the subject insincerely, Kristin engages and represents herself as engaged, but this repre-sentation is false. Thereby, Kristin keeps herself and her beliefs at an unacknowledged distance with which Abby cannot directly engage.
Attending to these distinctions may help to clarify that regulations of lies do not target the meaning of the utterance but rather the speaker and her relation to her utterance. Because regulation triggered by the speaker's belief or disbelief in the uttered proposition's content need not include elements relating to its content, its truth value, or the reactions of an audience to the substance of the proposition, regulating insincere speech need not constitute content-discrimination. 23 This argument demands some refinement. Sometimes the identity of the speaker bears on the content of the speech. This is obvious, of course, where the first-person pronoun is invoked. "I am hard at work," has a different meaning and refers to different occupations and persons depending on the identity of the speaker. Even where demonstratives are not used, the identity of the speaker (and other contextual features) may make a difference to content, as well as to the sort of speech act that is engaged in. The rabbi who, looking at a sloppily presented plate of food, pronounces, "That is not kosher," conveys that the food does not meet certain religious strictures. The secular supervising chef who says, "That is not kosher," uses "kosher" in a more colloquial sense and conveys that it is unacceptable to serve food in such a slapdash way. The CEO of an automobile company who declares publicly, "The 2015 model meets the highest safety standards," issues a warranty or guarantee. The blog reviewer who writes the same sentence does not issue a warranty but merely reports on the claims of the manufacturer and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Although who the speaker is may have some bearing on the content of what is expressed because the speaker's identity forms part of the (public) context that determines the utterance's meaning, still, the speaker's private, unexpressed belief, disbelief, and attitudes toward her utterance do not form part of that context. Whether an utterance is a lie is determined by the speaker's mental stance toward the content, that is, by her conscious disbelief of the utterance's content coupled with her deliberate intention to present that utterance to be taken as true. Those mental stances may be, and typically are, private and opaque at the time of utterance. Given that communication is essentially a public, shared activity, the meaning of an utterance within communicative activity could not sensibly vary from the private contents of the speaker's (or listener's) mind. So, whether an utterance is a lie or not should (generally) be irrelevant to the public meaning of the proposition uttered; hence, regulation of lies is not inherently content-discriminatory.
WHY WE CARE ABOUT CONTENT-DISCRIMINATION
The classic forms of content-discrimination about which we rightfully worry, however, regulate speech because of the meaning of the utterance. Canonical content-discrimination responds to the meaning of an utterance, by, for example, showing hostility to criticism of authority, hostility to an advocacy of Communism, or a sense that certain matters (e.g., sexuality) should not be public topics of discourse. The content-discriminatory regulation thus hinges on the meaning of what is said, but not on the beliefs of the speaker about that meaning. Indeed, where a regulation discriminates based on the content of the speech, whether the speaker mentally endorses or rejects the proposition uttered is irrelevant to the cause of action and to the utterance's regulability or nonregulability.
Sometimes, as with child pornography statutes and hostile audience regulation, the content-discrimination is indirect. The government regulates because it objects to the audience's (perceived) response to the content of the message. In New York v. Ferber, a child pornography case, the state objected to the audience's anticipated enjoyment of the materials and the effects that reaction to content had on the market, spurring production of more child pornography. 24 In the hostile audience cases, the government's objection was that the audience's hatred of the speaker's message generated excited reactions of an unwelcome sort. 25 Snyder v. Phelps, 26 the recent case holding that protestors near a military funeral engaging in offensive speech could not be held liable for causing the in.:. tentional infliction of emotional distress, involved both sorts of conten~-' discrimination, direct and indirect. Oversimplifying a bit, through the application of the emotional distress cause of action, the government was regulating speech both on the grounds that its message (at a particular venue and time) was outrageously offensive and that the audience of the speech would experience a devastating emotional reaction to the deliber-· ately cruel message and its presentation at that time and place. Although the cause of action requires showing that the protestors intended to cause distress or were reckless with respect to that effect, the protestors' own attitudes toward and beliefs toward the messages they carried, i.e., whether they endorsed, reviled, or were skeptical of those messages, would not serve as evidence that the elements of the cause of action were met, nor would they serve as defenses.
These examples reinforce my contention that classic forms of contentdiscrimination involve regulation in reaction to the substantive content of the proposition uttered and the reception of that substantive content by its audience. They do not single out the speech on the basis of the speaker's belief or attitude toward its content; content-discriminatory statutes are indifferent to these facts.
Nonetheless, although I am arguing that legal regulation of lies need not involve content-discrimination, one might think that the Stolen Valor Act involves content-discrimination, as must any plausible form of legal regulation of lies. The Stolen Valor Act, for instance, focuses on speech with a particular content: misrepresentations about extraordinary military service. Even if the arguably viewpoint discriminatory aspect of the Act were remedied, so that it focused more broadly on misrepresentations about one's participation or lack of participation in military service or public service, that revised act's requirements about sincerity would 25 Putting aside the so-called ":fighting words" doctrine, the Court, largely, has refused to allow the prospect of hostile audiences' negative reaction to a speaker's message to constitute a reason for regulation. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (invalidating application of a breach-of-peace ordinance to speakers whose speech created crowd antagonism); Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, SOS U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (invalidating a municipal fee mechanism that varied fees for parades depending on the level of predicted hostile reaction by others). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1951) (upholding conviction for disorderly conduct against a speaker because his provocative political speech caused restlessness and threats of violence).
26 131 S. Ct. 1207 Ct. (2011 still be triggered only by certain sorts of content-those about public service, but not donuts, political parties, or medical care. The dilemma is this: while comprehensive regulation of all lies might not constitute a form of content-discrimination, any tailored statute triggered by subject matter would; but, such tailoring seems essential to avoid granting the government an unthinkably vast amount of power, power that would, in turn, re-ignite valid concerns about government abuse. So, any plausible form of legal regulation of lies would concentrate on lies about certain subject areas. That focus, in turn, would again return us to the realm of content-regulation. I am less certain that the path to content-discrimination is inexorable in light of the content-independent reasons that should motivate governmental regulation. If the legally relevant objection to lying is that the lie threatens the basis for trust and reliance on others' testimony, this objection renders especially salient those circumstances under which others' testimony concerns especially important matters or those circumstances under which listeners are especially reliant on others' testimony. Although the former category may hone in on content-oriented topics, the latter category need not. Instead, it may be characterized as involving those circumstances in which speakers have special access to (or special authority about) information, rendering listeners reliant on speakers' testimony because they cannot easily or readily verify what is said in another way. Such a focus corresponds to a salient, content-independent method of· determining the scope of legal regulation by fixing on the relationship between the speaker (or the conditions of her speech) and the utterance. Perjury laws do this by restricting their scope to the utterances of speakers who testify under oath. The federal False Statements Accountability Act may be understood to do something analogous, to regulate false statements on the basis of a content-neutral identification of the recipient of the transmission: lies to government officials are regulable. 27 A more ambitious, speaker-oriented regulation might regulate lies by experts about the topics of their expertise, whether they are certified as experts on a topic, e.g., board-certified lawyers, accountants, and medical professionals, or, casting more broadly, they have or claim to have expertise about a topic, whether certified or not, such as manufacturers about their products, real estate developers about their plans, and even indi-viduals about themselves. 28 Regulating lies by experts about the contents of their actual, certified, or claimed expertise does not single out content. Rather, it attaches to a feature of the speaker and the relationship between the speaker and the utterance. This relationship is singled out ~ meriting regulation for content-independent reasons, namely that listeners should be able to rely upon the sincerity of experts because they have or claim special access to information that listeners either do not have, or reasonably should not be expected to cultivate on their own.
This understanding of the purpose of regulating lies might also support a "secondary effects" analysis of topic-specific regulation. Although the Court has sometimes been overly keen to identify secondary effects, 29 the secondary effects doctrine, properly understood, permits topic-specific regulation where the effects of speech merit regulation for reasons independent of its particular content or its reception. Suppose, for example, the reputation and trustworthiness of drug manufacturers fell to a low because of a spate of contaminations at factories, coupled with a lack of transparency about the problems. The government might then decide to regulate lies about pharmaceuticals specifically from a concern that misrepresentations would hobble the trustworthiness of future claims important to assisting people making decisions about their medications. Here, the regulation would be targeted to expert lies about a particular topic, but the grounds for the regulation would be that the strength of testimonial trust in utterances about that topic, whatever their content, was particularly vulnerable for reasons that were content-independent. Hence, regulation of lies and even some topic-specific regulation of lies may be framed and justified in ways that are at some remove from the territory of content-regulation. 28 Singling out the special responsibilities of experts making pronouncements within their area of expertise may offer a different rationale for asymmetrical liability in situations like Kasky v. Nike, in which Nike's advertisement touting sound labor con.ditions in its factories, which turned out to be untrue, was subject to different standards of accuracy than statements by its critics. See Kasl<y v. Nike Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002 243 (Cal. ), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 654 (2003 . Although the discussion of this case has focused on Nike's status as a commercial speaker (and a corporate, nonindividual speaker), it may be independently relevant that Nike is an expert on conditions in its own factories, and this fact may subject it to special requirements of accuracy a bout facts within its expertise. A related argument is that Nike had special access to information about its own factories and the legal ability to exclude others who wished to visit to verify or disconfum Nike's allegations, giving Nike a special obligation of accuracy. · 29 As I discuss elsewhere in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135 REV. , 1165 REV. -71 (2003 .
Compelled Disclosure
Perhaps a better way to categorize regulation of lies is as a form of compelled disclosure intended to facilitate a relationship of transparency, on equal footing between the speaker and listener, and thus to protect our relationships of epistemic cooperation. The case might be so framed as follows. As a default, we should be warranted in taking a person's freely volunteered speech to be sincere. 30 Prudentially, our complex social lives, involving the division of labor at every turn, depend on our ability to rely upon others' conveyed beliefs on a regular basis. Our moral lives likewise depend on our accurate knowledge of others' beliefs, feelings, and situations if we are to respond well to them, and our democratic lives depend upon respectful and, often, responsive engagement with the positions and concerns of others. Indeed, given these normative purposes, we may have some obligation to treat their speech as sincere, absent evidence to the contrary. To adopt a posture of epistemic remove or doubt toward them would involve distrust. That distrust would hinder our ability to engage with and respond to them fully, as equals; and without evidence of untrustworthiness, distrust seems unfair.
Where someone is, or represents herself to be, an expert on a topic, that warrant is heightened and justifiably so. Identifying and episternically relying on experts in some areas of knowledge, allows us to engage in epistemic divisions of labor that make possible the complex forms of social life that facilitate sophisticated understanding of our environment, richer and healthier lives, lives that may manifest greater independence from the vagaries of the physical environment and from dependence on particular individuals, and the development of diverse sets of opportunities that are tailored to individuals' diverse abilities and interests. Our epistemic reliance on experts only functions well when we are warranted in our default epistemic dependence on their testimony. · Offering insincere speech under the guise of sincerity threatens the rational warrant to engage in these salutary forms of epistemic dependence. Because we have strong reasons to protect these environments of warranted dependence, disclosure rules are justified. Should one wish to volunteer insincere speech, one must disclose this, whether through direct discourse or by taking advantage of culturally well-understood mechanisms of disclosure, such as deploying a: sarcastic tone, evidently exag-gerating in ways that indicate parody or irony, publishing under the rubric of fiction, performing in a play or other theatrical setting, or otherwise speaking in a context that is culturally understood not to call for somber testimonial speech (e.g., certain contexts in which demands of etique~te are understood to drive content). 31 So understood, legal regulation would not react to the liar for the content of what she said but for violating rules of compelled disclosure. 32 Such rules of compelled disclosure would be importantly less demanding than most rules of compelled disclosure, because most rules demand disclosure of the identity of the speaker or the articulation of specific messages. 33 This rule would require neither. I suggest we regard legal regulation of lies as a content-independent form of compelled disclosure that is compatible even with anonymous speech. All this form of regulation requires is that the speaker (who may remain anonymous) disclose, whether through explicit or through customary means, 34 that she does not believe her speech if it otherwise is presented in a way that would support an objective interpretation that the speech is presented as somber, testimonial speech. Properly framed, I think the question of the legal regulation of lies is whether freedom of speech is inconsistent with requiring disclosure of the modality of the speech, so understood, or whether other important values counsel against such requirements.
To summarize, because the aim of the regulation is to facilitate the ability of speakers to convey, and listeners to understand, that the speaker transmits her sincere belief, this aim seems far afield from the standard 31 I am here describing, in a different way, the idea of suspended contexts, discussed in Chapter One.A related form of disclosure is one in which the speaker reveals that she serves as the spokesperson or translator for another party. In such cases, the speaker places herself in a justified, epistemic suspended context with respect to whether her utterances represent her beliefs, but the presumption of truthfulness may still hold with respect to whether the spokesperson's utterances accurately represent the person or entity that she represents.
32 See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 236 (2010) (contrasting disclosure requirements to combat otherwise misleading speech and affirmative limitations on speech and holding that, at least for commercial speech, the former calls for a less exacting form of scrutiny than the latter). 33 See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'! Fed'n of the Blind of N.C. Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 799 & n.11 (1988) (invalidating a requirement that a fundraiser immediately disclose what percentage of donations are passed on to the charity, but indicating that a disclosure requirement that a professional fundraiser merely identify herself as such would pass First Amendment muster).
34 The "customary" means employed to signal that the content is not intended to be taken as true may be tailored to shared understandings with patticular audience members and need not conform to a widespread social custom. Here, we might borrow from what is necessary to fulfill the objective intention test in contracts.
C concerns about content-regulation, namely that the government is attempting to control or suppress speech with particular contents. To the contrary, this sort of regulation merely aims to ensure that whatever is being sincerely conveyed can be successfully conveyed and recognized as sincere without distortion. Such distortion is generated when insincere speakers fail to constrain their insincerity to a justified and identifiable context. In this way, regulation of lies closely resembles noise regulation that aims to confine the side effects of noise within one speech domain from seeping into another in ways that obstruct the ability of participants in the latter to hear and understand one another.
Of course, the ultimate issue is not whether legal regulation of lies is content-discriminatory. Whether this regulation constitutes contentdiscrimination or not, what matters is whether this speech regulation intrudes upon, restricts, or otherwise inhibits valuable forms of speech or whether, in other ways, it manifests an unacceptable hostility or presents unreasonable burdens to speakers and listeners. So, let's turn to the other arguments offered for wariness about the legal regulation of lies. REv. 70, 117 (2012) (emphasizing that either a particularized effort to gain material advantage over the listener or the infliction of "colorable material harm" should be preconditions of regulation).
Harm, Particularized Victims, and Freedom of Speech
~ Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (plurality opinion). eral concern with government overreach: a demand that there be a tight connection to relevant harm would set limits to what might otherwise be a rather broad grant of government power. Although these concerns complement each other, as I argued above, there are other ways to address the concern about over-enabling the government. Does the purportedly loose connection between lying and legally cognizable harm to specific people raise independent free speech concerns? As a general matter, neither version of the complaint that there is an insufficiently tight connection between lying and legally cognizable harm seems tenable as an independent objection. Justice Kennedy may well be right that the administration failed to demonstrate that the lies of Mr. Alvarez and others like him diminished the esteem in which actual veterans and service-members were held by the public. But, as I have stressed, there are other harms to consider. As I have been arguing, deliberately false speech does damage to our collective testimonial framework by giving us reasons to doubt that a person's word is reliable as such and that somber testimonial speech provides us with warrants to take what is offered as representing what is believed. That is, deliberately insincere speech does collective harm by ambiguating signals that function well only when fairly clear, signals whose preservation and use are crucial for sustaining a functional moral and political culture.
Lies directed at particular individuals also do particularized harm by corroding the foundation of justified testimonial trust between the liar and her audience members. Thus, Justice Breyer shows shocking insensitivity when he blithely suggests that" ... in family, social, or other private contexts ... lies will often cause little harm." 38 To the contrary, in relationships that regularly draw upon such trust and may gain some of their special significance by the ongoing vindication and exercise of such trust, betrayals of that trust would seem to wreak special damage on the relationship and its meaning. 39 Notably, these arguments appeal to the reasons for belief that are supported or undermined by people's testimonial practices. The diminishment of the listener's warrant to believe the speaker merely on her say-so is a rational entailment from the speaker's lie. The diminishment of the faith. Being invited or drawn into a bad-faith relationship that one cannot exit is arguably harmful; it is certainly a poor way to be treated.
warrant is not an empirical event to be observed or measured. Consequently, because this is not primarily an empirical argument, the demand for empirical causal proof is inapposite.
To be sure, this nonempirical problem has important empirical counterparts. When people appreciate that their reasons to accept others' testimony have been diminished, the culture of trust will noticeably deteriorate. (Some of us fret we hav~ already reached this point; others, I find, are more sanguine about the current culture.) But, we need not wait for this consequence to appear for the public interest to be adversely affected. I am not merely making the point that a reasonable prediction of the consequence would be enough, just as the government may preemptively adopt noise regulations that preclude the operation of gas compressors in a residential neighborhood rather than having to wait for a cacophony before addressing its predictable cause. My further point is that we are already adversely affected when our reasons to believe others are threatened, whether we realize, acknowledge, and internalize that threat or not. So too we are adversely affected when lies introduce an epistemic need to investigate and confirm the particular reliability of individual speakers or their reliability about specific topics, e.g., when we must garner particular evidence of their truthfulness as individuals or about specific topics before we may take their speech to offer acceptable warrants. Again, we may have this need before we recognize it.
To demand not only empirical evidence of harm but also a showing of particularized harm to specific people as a constitutional prerequisite for governmental regulation is a rather perverse idea, especially in light of "standing" doctrines that preclude private suits to vindicate diffuse collective harms. That is, requirements of particularized harm usually figure in "standing" requirements that identify which parties are eligible to pursue private actions on their own behalf. 40 One of the justifications for the standing doctrine is that governmental regulation, rather than private suits, represents the more appropriate way to handle diffuse threats to the collective interest. 41 Hence, it is rather jarring to encounter the undif-ferentiated impact of pure lies as a rationale for invalidating governmental regulation. Given our strong standing doctrines, governmental regulation becomes the only mechanism to vindicate diffuse, collective interests. To demand a showing of particularized harm as a condition for government regulation in this domain, then, seems, confusedly, to extend standing requirements to state action, an extension that conflicts with a leading justification of the standing doctrine and the responsibility it assigns to government to vindicate collective interests.
We can lay bare the peculiarity of Justice Breyer's demand that par" ticularized harm must be shown by drawing a limited comparison to regulations on excessive noise, or time, place, and manner restrictions that levy specific ceilings on noise (think of requirements that audiences use whispers rather than megaphones for side-commentary at a lecture). One legitimate aim of noise regulations is to enable others to speak and be heard without distortion, strain, or intermittent interruption. Preserving the ability of all to speak and be heard is a constitutionally legitimate aim, even if no particular parties are singled out or injured by violations of the ordinance (suppose that in the face of such noise, all parties declined to try to speak or listen, so no one's speech in particular was disrupted). The point of demanding a showing of harm is to ensur.e that speech is not regulated merely because many find it distasteful or to ensure that the regulation pursues a legally appropriate interest and does not regulate immoral behavior as such. These are legitimate aims, but they do not entail a requirement of particularized harm. These constraints are satisfied if the motivation for regulation is to preserve the scheme of reliable communication or to adopt a public stance that reliability is a communal good.
I have been arguing that a stress oh particularized harm through deceptive impact reflects an overly restrictive understanding of the wrong of the lie. Correcting this myopic view would also impugn the common invocation of "counter-speech" as a preferable response over regulation. The Court, for example, argued that the dangers associated with misrepresentations could be sufficiently addressed through the remedy of counter-speech, a less restrictive alternative than legal regulation. 42 also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-77 ("Vindicating the public interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (reviewing that the standing doctrine "embraces ... the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches"). 42 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549-51.
Counter-speech can be an effective remedy where the putative harm of speech flows from its content and counter-speech can expose the reasons to reject that content. Hence, counter-speech can expose the false content of a deceptive representation and thereby guard against the risk of the audience gaining false beliefs. Of course, where the information is not widely known or is exclusively possessed by the speaker, this option may be unavailable or delayed, rendering it only partially effective.
Counter-speech does not, however, speak to the damage from the lie itself, independent of its likely deceptive impact. The lie itself indicates a willingness on the part of its issuer to use speech to misrepresent while presenting that speech as veridical. This willingness undermines the reliability of that speaker's testimonial warrants. It gives us reason to reduce our confidence in testimonial warrants from the speaker. Counter-speech by others cannot restore those warrants. Only an apology and a demonstrable commitment to change by the liar could do that, but that is neither something we cah rely on nor what the "counter-speech" advocates have in mind.
The demonstration that our fellow citizens are willing to lie may also give us reason to doubt testimonial warrants as such even more generally. Should members of the public come to believe that such willingness may be widespread, socially tolerated, or that our own obligations to, truthfulness wane when the conditions of reciprocity are flouted, the consequent reduction may be severe. Although our obligations to truthfulness do not, as I have argued earlier, diminish just because others contravene them, the state may reasonably take an interest in forestalling or responding to currents in the culture that in fact reduce compliance with politically relevant forms of moral behavior, even if those currents represent unjustified reactions to others' malfeasance.
Whether by government or by individuals, counter-speech castigating lying may help dispel the impression that deliberate misrepresentation is acceptable and help keep moral morale and resolve high. But, counter-speech cannot dispel the impression that it is legally discretionary whether to misrepresent (and so acceptable in that way). More importantly, it cannot work against the unreliability of the speaker that the · speaker's own misrepresentation introduces. Whereas,. if legal regulation were effective in motivating (some) speakers not to misrepresent and in establishing public recognition of a collective interest in truthful speech, in these ways it would be qualitatively more effective than counter-speech.
Distinguishing the Value of False Speech from the Disvalue of Misrepresentation
THE MILLIAN ARGUMENT
A complementary argument, made alongside the appeal to counterspeech, is that even false speech has value, for the Millian reason that entertaining the false provokes exposition and exposure of the truth and sharpens our understanding of it. 43 That venerable idea is misapplied here and does not discredit legal regulation of the lie. The Millian argument concerns propositions expressed by an utterance and the value of the expression of those propositions, even if they turn out to be false. It does not purport to justify the disbelieved utterance (whether it is true or false).
Notably, in the passage in On Liberty where Mill advances his argument for the value of false speech, he is discussing the merits of the suppression of opinions, arguing that people should be allowed to express their actual opinions, even if their opinions are false in the sense of being wrongheaded. 44 That is, he stresses the importance of having the opportunity to say what one believes or what one thinks one might believe, even if these believed propositions are false. This opportunity connects directly to the needs of the thinker to externalize her (actual) mental content to garner the reactions of others and to assess whether she in fact wishes to continue to endorse it. Once we distinguish between sincere opinions that happen to be false or incorrect and insincerely expressed opinions, Mill's argument makes sense only if we consider the former; it lacks clear application to the latter. 45 I will elaborate. First, Mill's argument makes little sense in the case of lies on matters about which the speaker has special or exclusive access to relevant information. A false statement can only provoke exposure of the truth when others have timely access to evidence relevant to justifying or challenging the relevant proposition. Where the speaker has special or exclusive access to relevant information and functions epistemically as an expert, the checking function Mill imagines is blocked and this argument falls flat. Hence, it seems difficult to celebrate the value of false speech on Millian grounds if one has in mind expert speech about 43 See id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring}. 45 See also Schauer, supra note 2, at 905 (observing that Mill was discussing opinions and not factual assertions}. factual matters for which there is limited public access (e.g., expert speech about company policy, the contents of a secret formula, or what transpired at a private meeting), and the same is true of many forms of autobiographical speech, the foundations of which the speaker has special access to. 46 Second, Mill's own discussion imagines sincere opponents, both attempting to express and make progress on discerning what is true. He is not extolling the virtues of false statements per se, and certainly not of deliberate misrepresentation. Rather, the argument aims to vindicate the rights of sincere minorities to make their case, even when the consensus is against them. The argument imagines a vigorous debate between parties who both have access to what relevant information exists on a topi~, such as the existence of God, both advancing their best understandings of how to interpret the evidence. It is difficult to extrapolate from the right of the sincere to attempt to persuade others of what, they believe, to a right of the insincere to engage in deliberate misrepresentation.
There are strong reasons to resist that extrapolation. Our respect for others demands that we permit them to lay bare their beliefs and that we grapple with their sincere takes on the world. Moreover, given the fallibility Mill rightly emphasizes, we should be open to the possibility that we are incorrect and others are right. That idea, however, is a· far cry from the idea that among the myriad of logically possible positions fot us to entertain, we should be indifferent about which propositions we consider, paying equal attention to those actually believed by speakers and those disbelieved by the speakers who forward them as true.
Mill's argument from fallibility, while stressing open-mindedness as a reaction to the possibility of error, is not a component of a larger cynicism or nihilism. Rather, it serves as counsel to assist in the discovery of truth. It assumes that we stand some chance in doing so. In our efforts to advance the project of discovering the truth; we have to focus our inquiries. Our time and attention are limited. If we aim to identify and appreciate the truth, it is beyond foolhardy to devote those limited resources by launching off from random starting points. It makes sense to take seriously the sincere hypotheses (and doubts) of those also seeking to advance the truth who have considered the matter in good faith, and it makes sense not to assess that good faith in terms of our sense of the validity of the hypotheses themselves. But, none of these considerations suggest that we should be equally open to hypotheses that are actively, though not transparently, rejected as unworthy by those advancing thein.
I do not dispute the importance of a vigorous presentation and a ca~e-ful consideration of important' counterarguments, even those that are both false and believed by no one, as a method of fully appreciating the case for the correct position and ensuring that it is in fact correct. The issue is whether it is a central aspect of their value that such arguments be presented not just vigorously, but represented as believed by the advocate even when that representation is false. It may be true that the presentation of a counterargument is less powerful and easier to dismiss when it is presented as merely a counterargument and not backed by the full weight of the speaker's conviction. That surely gives a reason, as Mill himself argued, for hearing contrary opinions "from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them" rather than from lackluster reporters who immediately discredit the contrary opinion they dutifully recount. 47 The centrality of vigorous advocacy also supports the importance of establishing contexts of argument in which competing advocates advance contrary positions, but where the advocates on all sides are understood to serve as the 1'epresentatives of positions, while leaving their personal convictions ambiguous and obscured. Thereby, the arguments stand for themselves and do not depend upon the authority of their articulators. This is, I take it, the posture of advocates in the courtroom, who are meant to represent their positions with ferocity but are barred from representing their positions as their personal conclusions. 48 Unbridled advocacy for false views may be important, but its purposes may be achieved without protecting deliberate misrepresentation.
Thus, Mill's real but often mischaracterized point that sincere advocacy is superior to patently insincere advocacy does not vindicate equating the sincere, but misled, advocate's speech with the liar's speech. It gives us no reason to think that we would lose valuable speech if the law required insincere advocates either to divulge their disbelief or refrain from unambiguously representing their position as their sincere, personal 47 MILL, supra note 44, at 42. 48 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2002) . "A lawyer shall not ... assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused .... " Nearly every U.S. state has either adopted this language or some version of its content.
conviction. 49 Mill's argument provides no reason to believe that the insincere speech of the liar will add something essential that the zealous, but ambiguously committed, advocate lacks. Both lack sincere conviction, but the former misrepresents himself and the latter does not.
Deliberate misrepresentation should give us pause, and not merely because the liar devalues his testimony and contributes to a broader culture of unreliability. It also conflicts with our political obligations to compromise. As I remarked earlier, part of the respect we owe to others is to listen and grapple with their good-faith beliefs about the world and how we should live together. Often, politically, we should do more than listen and engage. Healthy political life demands some degree of compromise and adjustment to others' points of view, even when one has the political power to ignore the positions of the out-voted. Put aside controversies about how much one should compromise and whether one should ever compromise about matters of justice. On nearly any view of the social foundations of legitimacy, stability, and mutual respect, according some weight to the genuine convictions and preferences of competing political sides is an important aspect of governance. 50 But this posture and the willingness to forgo insistence on what one believes best only makes sense if citizens do not misrepresent those convictions.
Deliberate, unambiguous misrepresentation not only eviscerates the point of compromise, it fuels its cynical opposition. It justifies the suspicion that parties do not negotiate and compromise from: genuine positions of conviction, but rather that they advance false positions to gain leverage and advantage. Misrepresentation undermines the crucial sense of reciprocity-,-of mutual commitment to acting and arguing in good faith-that is essential to sustaining a culture of well-considered compromise. 51 Thus, the proffering of insincere opinions does not sharpen our 49 To provide a safe cushion for spontaneity and emotional expressions of zealousness, it may be prudent to adopt strict standards about what counts as unambiguous affirmation and, as a default, assume that advocacy may be (implicitly) uncertain, hypothetical, or contingent.
so See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES (2010). For a Republican's concern that this approach to governance is waning within the Republican party, see David Brooks, The Mother of All No-Brainers, N. Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2011 at
A21.
51 See also the related argument of Micah Schwartzman that strategic, insincere political arguments diminish the epistemic value of deliberation in Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. PoL. PHIL. 3 75, 378, 392 (2011 ) . Schwartzman's argument operates within the ideal of public reason in which citizens are expected to support policies and offer political arguments on grounds others could reasonably accept. My argument hinges on a weaker premise about the conditions for achieving reasonable compromise, political convictions in the way that merely false but sincere opinions do. 52 Instead, their recital either threatens the legitimacy of the content of our compromises or threatens our willingness to engage in them, that is, it jeopardizes our willingness to discharge a political duty. n SELF-DEFINITION Let me turn to the argument that regulation of lies would interfere with an individual's interest in "self-definition." 54 An individual's privacy interests and her interests in control over the presentation of her persona can be protected by her selective choice of what true things to reveal and whether to reveal information at all. But, it is rather hard, I think, to classify lies as elements of the project of self-definition: saying something false about oneself does not make it true or thereby render the voiced characteristic a true aspect of oneself. Advocates of this position leave it unclear how the protection of the lie contributes to the project of selfdefinition and, concomitantly, why the ability to present edited and partial (but sincere) accounts of oneself is insufficient to satisfy the interest in self-definition. 55 The ability to decide what to reveal and to what conditions that must be present in both ideal and nonideal conditions. Indeed, protecting the conditions of fair compromise may be especially important if we do not adhere to the requirements of public reason and if citizens advocate positions that rely on comprehensive theories of the good (and/or factual theories) that others may reasonably reject. 52 In extolling the necessity of truthfulness to furthering legitimate political compromise, I do not mean to diminish the importance of irony, rhetoric, storytelling, humor, or self-discovery through communication within public discourse. See Elizabeth Markovits,
The Trouble with Being Earnest: Deliberative Democracy and the Sincerity Norm, 14 J.
PoL. PHIL. 249, 250, 260-66 (2006) (worrying that an ethic of sincerity excludes other forms of discourse). My claim is only that the uses of nontruthful discourse should be transparent to interlocutors (although the signal of its invocation need not be so clunky as to interfere with its effectiveness).
53 For these reasons, I am less convinced than my esteemed colleague that the admittedly powerful instrumental arguments against regulating deliberate dishonesty in political advertising carry the day. See Varat, supra note 17, at 1108, 1120-22.
54 See Han, supra note 35, at 104-08, 127-28; United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). 55 Han does not confront this question, but rather emphasizes that one's partial revelations a bout oneself run the risk of deceiving listeners into thinking that the partial story is more representative of the whole than it is. See Han, supra note 35, at 101-02. He then attempts to leverage this argument to suggest that direct misrepresentations are no more disturbing than the partial, true revelations whose potential for deception we already tolerate. See id. This argument fails, I think, for two main reasons: first, there are independent objections to direct misrepresentation apart from the risk of deception and second, listeners exposed to partial revelations are capable of assessing that what they hear is partial and may both adjust their conclusions accordingly and ask further follow-up questions to gauge the extent and content of the absent information.
propositions to commit are indeed fundamental components of autonomy, components that undergird much of the protection against compelled speech. Yet, protection of those abilities does not preclude moral or legal prohibitions on lies. Moreover, if an aspect of one's self-definition consists of one's relations to others, that project is stymied when others misrepresent themselves. The relationships one thereby forms are not based on a mutual and commonly understood foundation and the responses to one's speech that one receives do not help one hone one's selfunderstanding, because they are not responses to sincere, if tentative, representations of oneself.
By way of rejoinder, it could be insisted that an aspect of self-definition involves making up one's mind and figuring out what one thinks. That process, as I argued in the last chapter, may reasonably require communicative interaction with others in which one articulates propositions to see if they ring true, much as one might try on a dress to see if it fits. Testing the proposition for this purpose may involve asserting it in a definitive, rather than a tentative register, much as assessing a true fit demands zipping up the back and not merely holding up the garment in front of the mirror. Although, as I maintained when discussing the Millian arguments about the value of false speech, tentative or qualified pronouncements may be sufficient to allow audiences of contested propositions to assess the arguments in and against their favor, for some people and some issues, matters may differ when they attempt to identify their core commitments. In such cases, determining whether something "fits" oneself may require a more wholehearted assumption of the mantle.
This argument has greater purchase with respect to the articulation of opinions, e.g., about immigration reform and the legitimacy of the death penalty, or about one's intentions, e.g., to seek a new career or to alter one's religious practice, than it does with respect to other sorts of facts, including the kind of historical autobiographical facts uttered by Mr. Alvarez about his actual military service. Still, one might make a credible case that, in some instances, the assertion of autobiographical fact, even about a past event, can play a role in assessing whether that assertion is true; for example, some people in emotional distress may, in reaction to a therapist's hypothesis, assert they were victims of past abuse to see if, once said aloud, it resonates as true.
This version of the self-definition argument speaks more to how regulation should be crafted than to the constitutionality of all such regulation. The lie encompasses assertions made without qualification that the speaker does not believe but presents to be taken as true and as believed.
Arguably, the sorts of exploratory assertions discussed above need not be presented to be taken as true but may be presented in a more experimental mode (even if unqualified), so they need not involve lies in this serise at all. But, given the likelihood of exuberance and exaggeration in m,alters of self-presentation, such efforts may not always be carefully constructed and may involve the use of lies so understood.
Even so, the self-definition argument only has strong purchase where the speaker is uncertain. It does not really apply when the speaker makes repeated, confident assertions over time of propositions that she definitively rejects as false. Such utterances are not credibly understood as central to self-discovery, but they do threaten our testimonial relations. These observations suggest a distinction between the moral conception of a lie and the legal conception of the lie. Morally, one may lie when one confidently asserts propositions about which one knows one is agnostic or lacks sufficient evidence to support a belief (and one's assertion happens outside a justified suspended context). But, to ensure breathing room for the process of self-discovery, in autobiographical cases, the legal definition of the lie should be more restricted, applying to the somber, unqualified assertion of propositions that one actively disbelieves. 56 Thus crafted, the regulation would ensure that the agnostic struggling to locate her position is not accidentally captured. Adopting this narrower definition of the lie for legal purposes seems appropriately sensitive to the selfdefinition interest.
Perhaps the threat posed by legal regulation to self-definition is that legal regulation muddies the public expression of one's sincerity. Some worry that if lies are subject to legal penalties, then truthful claims may be interpreted as the product of legal coercion and legal compliance rather than emanating from an individual speaker's moral earnestness. 57 Further, given the backdrop of legal regulation, listeners will be unsure whether a sincere speaker spoke from the motive of legal compliance or from moral earnestness.
This complaint that well-crafted, non-draconian legal regulation will objectionably crowd out sincerity or its perception seems far-fetched. In most cases that would fall under legal regulation, agents need not speak on the matter at all, and their voluntary decision to communicate and 56 I advocate this restriction only for the autobiographical lies of individuals. In my discussion of "puffery" in Chapter Six, I criticize the legal regime for permitting businesses to issue strongly worded opinions about their products when they are insincere or lack reasonable evidence that would support a sincere belief in those opinions.
57 Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 675 (Kozinski, C.J.,, concurring).
. reveal information in the first place would convey their good will, even if the law required that such communications be sincere. A speaker interested in conveying her motivations for speaking sincerely could clarify why she was revealing what she was revealing and could, through her other actions and through other speech, reinforce that her sincerity was not primarily determined by the threat of legal regulation. The insecure listener could ask questions to prompt further revelations about the reasons for the speech and the nature of the relationship. This is, roughly, how we manage the present latent uncertainty about whether truth-tellers are motivated by the value of sincerity or by the prospect of facing extralegal, social sanctions for insincerity.
Moreover, it is unclear why legal regulation would alter the dominant motive for sincerity. Most moral agents will engage in sincere utterances (or remain silent) for the general reason that sincerity is morally and usually prudentially required (whether that be concern for the audience, for the communicative relationship, for the integrity of communication, or for some other reason unrelated to its legal status). We do not worry that legal regulation of assault, theft, or littering undermines the meaning of safe relationships and conscientious environmental behavior. Rather than replacing our moral motivations, a well-designed law regulating pure lies would more likely supplement them. It would provide a public articulation of our collective interest in sincerity and establish a set of background expectations that might serve as a sort of backstop motivation for moral compliance for the good-but-tempted moral agent, and perhaps as the primary motivation for the more compromised moral agent. With respect to the latter, if the law does make the dispositive difference to whether the agent tells the truth or not, the law will not have undermined the meaning of his sincerity, because it will not have converted an instance of well-motivated sincerity into a coerced utterance.
HARD CASES OF INTEGRITY AND CONTESTED CONCEPTS
Before leaving issues of self-definition and identity, let me address some related hard cases, all of which involve contested concepts that in turn propel misrepresentations motivated by sincerity and considerations of personal integrity. Consider these three cases:
Transgender resistance: Kris, a transgender woman who is chromosomally male, somberly and sincerely declares, "I am a woman," but knows that she speaks to an audience who will reasonably understand her to mean her chromosomal sex is female. Kris sincerely believes that chromosomal and other sex-based criteria of gender are inappropriate, and so she speaks using her own criteria, although she is aware that her audience deploys chromosomal and other sex-based criteria.
Resisting bigotry: A local bigot asks Kim whether a newcomer to the local bar is a "such-and-such," where the actual term deployed is a derogatory label; although Kim knows the newcomer may meet all of the factual criteria embedded within the concept "such-andsuch," Kim issues a denial, "No, she's not," because she refuses to acquiesce to the bigotry embedded in the particular term.
Political resistance: In Freedonia, Max's friend Bailey is convicted of the felony of seditious libel for publishing a truthful story that detailed a public official's embezzlements. Max regards the seditious libel law as an offense to democratic principles and a core violation of basic human rights. Consequently, he regards Bailey as a hero, not a criminal. In Max's view, to be a criminal requires the violation of a serious and fundamentally just law. When Max is subsequently interviewed for a position with the government, he is asked a series of yes or no questions, one of which is whether he associates. with any criminals. Max knows that according to the government's criteria, which seem to govern the context of an official interview by the state, Bailey qualifies as a criminal in virtue of her conviction.
Max believes, however, that these criteria are seriously morally defective and that it would be wrong to acquiesce in them. So, he answers "no."
In all of these cases, the speaker's beliefs and opinions place her sincerity in conflict with the conceptual presuppositions of the context (or at least of the known understandings of the audience). 58 Cases like these raise (at least) two questions: First, are these misrepresentations lies? Second, are they protected by freedom of speech as forms of sincerity and identity formation or identity performance? 58 I am grateful to Netta Barak-Corren for raising the transgender case, and to Mark Richard for raising questions about the related issue of how to view communications between speakers and listeners who disagree over the standards of precision appropriate to the use of a particular concept in a particular communicative context, e.g., what level of wealth constitutes being "rich." For like examples and a discussion of the relevance of such disagreements to other disputes in epistemology and the philosophy of language, see Mark Richard, Contextualism and Relativism, 119 PHIL. Sruo. 215 (2004) .
It may seem peculiar to say that these speakers lied because they all sincerely applied the standards they endorse and, in light of those standards, said what they believed to be true. Yet, epistemically, the audience would reasonably, or at least predictably, misunderstand the speaker. The speaker would have misrepresented his or her beliefs, assessed under the criteria of the concepts that the speaker is aware are operating in the context, but without revealing that she deploys different criteria.
One fairly straightforward way to resist classifying the first two cases as lies is to regard them as falling into one of the categories of justified suspended contexts. The first speaker resists an invasion of privacy that threatens to transform into a form of bigotry. This misrepresentation, thus, may fall into the categories of the suspended contexts of reasonable privacy protection or reasonable self-protection and defense. So, for my purposes, her statement is not a lie. (Or, as others may see it, it is not a wrongful lie.) So, too, the second case resembles a milder version of the cases discussed in Chapter One, in which misrepresentations offered. to avoid directly contributing to a wrongful end were justified. Here, we might understand the request to confirm a bigoted classification, especially one that might have repercussions for the target's safety, as creating a suspended context, so that the listener should not expect answers to be sincere or to convey reliable information.
The details may matter. The suggestion of danger may do some work in how we think about the first two examples. When that suggestion is removed, we may edge closer to regarding these misrepresentations as lies. This seems clearer in the third case, Political Resistance, which lacks this feature. Bailey is in no new danger if Max agrees that Bailey is a criminal. Although Max's motives for denying that Bailey is a criminal are admirable and Max speaks sincerely by his own lights, the brevity of his answer is morally troubling. Were he presented with the opportunity to say more than "yes" or "no," something would be morally amiss if he did not elaborate by indicating his disagreement with the presuppositions of the context. Moreover, whether Max can elaborate or not, a spare "no" may risk deception. Additionally, the conscientious but undisclosed, private use of different conceptions of the same concept or different standards of precision frustrates the purposes of communication.
In light of these complexities, what should we say? On the one hand, given his sincerity, it feels awkward to declare that Max lies, because his declaration is driven by his conscientious objection to the presuppositions embedded in the question. On the other hand, liars do not always have venal motives; the fact that Max is morally motivated does not itself seem like a reason to deny that he has lied. We might be tempted by the more refined idea that one does not lie if one speaks sincerely with reference to one's own conception of relevant standards and concepts or perhaps, even more narrowly, if one speaks sincerely with reference to morally correct standards and concepts. Although these suggestions have some plausibility, ultimately, it seems that merely private sincerity is insufficient to insulate one from the charge of lying. Merely private sincerity still subverts the communicative relationship in a nontransparent way. To privilege merely private sincerity risks some of the familiar pitfalls associated with the doctrine and practice of "mental reservation" 59 by confusing the ethics of a bilateral communicative relationship with the ethics of purely personal virtue.
We may better capture our sympathy for Max, on some versions of the story, by focusing on the constrained nature of the colloquy-the demand for an unadorned "yes or no" answer. When the constraints of a colloquy prohibit explanatory clarifications and thereby do not permit the speaker to convey her thoughts with the precision necessary for a modicum of accurate self-presentation, those constraints themselves thereby subvert the purposes of the truth presumption and of non-suspended contexts. It is, therefore, no surprise that we feel that some freedom of speech values are at play, although I suspect the free speech concerns attach not to Max's answer but to the artificially stunted nature of the communicative exchange.
My tentative suggestion, then, is that otherwise reasonable demands for information that take the form of requiring a simple "yes or no" answer, when combined with significant (unjustified) obstacles to clari- 59 The doctrine of mental reservation emerged in Catholic theological circles in the sixteenth century. According to this doctrine, if a speaker voiced a proposition she did not believe but then qualified it mentally and privately such that she did believe the combination of its public and private elements, then she did not lie. For example, if asked whether one took money from the kitty and, in fact, one had but did not wish it known, one could say, "No, I did not take money from the kitty," and then add, mentally, the qualification "in the last two hours." The doctrine is obviously insufficiently sensitive to the social purposes of communication and the interests of hearers. It may have seemed attractive to those focused on whether, in the presence of God, a being purported to have access both to one's mind and to one's public statements, one affirmed propositions one believed to be false and whether one resisted self-deception. More moderate use of it was advocated by some as a way to elude unjust danger or unjust inquiries. See PEREZ ZAGORIN, WAYS OF LYING 153-221 (1990) ; see also SISSELA BoK, LYING 35-37 (1978) . Interestingly, the federal oath of office executed by all U.S. officials (but the President) explicitly excludes mental reservation. One must swear to " ... take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion .... " 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). fication, 60 generate a justified suspended context with respect to their answers. The obstacles to clarification create a pro tanto normative permission for the questioned party to refuse to adhere to those embedded standards and presuppositions within the communicative context when adherence to them would place her sincerity and beliefs in tension; where clarification is significantly constrained, the recipient of the communication has reason to doubt that he has received an accurate account of the contents of the speaker's mind and has no basis for complaint about that fact. 61 Where the speaker has an opportunity to expand upon his answer and clarify the disagreement about the applicable criteria, but forgoes that opportunity, then I think it is fair to say that he has (wrongfully) lied. Further, even though the speaker's misrepresentations may be driven by motives of sincerity and personal integrity, they do not seem to be protected by freedom of speech. Freedom of speech would protect the speaker's full explanatory answer, and, often, her right to give a full explanatory answer or a refusal to answer, but not the middle ground occupied by the deliberate misrepresentation. 62 
MISREPRESENTATION TO FURTHER SOCIAL RELATIONS
Finally, some commend insincere speech for its role in lubricating social relations and thereby connect insincere speech with free ·speech values. It is alleged that misrepresentations play an important role in etiquette, by strengthening relationships that would be made fraught by (too much) 60 Think of those frustrating forms and surveys that offer only inadequate classificatory options and no box for comments.
61 I bracket the more complicated question of when recipients would have grounds for complaint if they were thereby deceived by the speaker's answer. That question is more complex, in part because with respect to the duties surrounding deception, it may matter whether the recipient is among those responsible for, or beneficiaries of, the constraints placed on the communication; whether the recipient has reason to know of the constraints; and when speakers are responsible, if ever, for preventing unreasonable inferences by listeners.
62 A further question concerns whether the speaker must herself be the party who elects not to avail herself of the opportunity to give a fuller answer. If that responsibility be vested in another independent party, it may help to explain why leading questions may be posed within a courtroom but yet witnesses under oath may perjure themselves if they privately substitute their own standards and conceptual criteria for the operative ones governing in the courtroom. Within an adversarial system, the reason the witness might. be expected to answer truthfully within the confines of the operative standards is that the attorney on the other side has the ability to ask further open-ended questions that permit clarification. Because the point of communicative endeavor within the courtroom is to elicit the truth through fair and adversarial means, we might locate the responsibility for protecting the communicative environment to the judge and the attorneys, rather than to the particular witnesses.
truth, and by saving oneself and others from embarrassment and invasions of privacy. 63 Although this line of argument is driven by some important insights, its strength relies on conflating lies with reticence, mete deception, and with the use of suspended contexts in which the presumption of sincerity does not operate. The case for the legal regulation of lies does not depend on the questionable view that we must adopt a practice of frequent, regular revelations of all painful truths or a practice of correcting all misunderstandings of our audience. There is an important distinction between directly advancing and affirming a falsehood and permitting (and even encouraging) another to form or retain a false belief. In some cases, the latter violates a duty of care toward supporting the accuracy of others' beliefs, but in other cases, especially in domains of privacy and social relations, there may be no such default duty. Yet many of the examples offered by way of demonstrating the value of lies of this kind instead involve failures to disclose painful information or partial truths that may, predictably, be misunderstood by listeners as denials of painful truths. As I discussed in Chapter One, when the listener develops or retains a false belief from a sincere communication coupled with a failure to disclose, this is a case of deception but not of a lie because the false belief is not the result of a direct and explicit misrepresentation of the speaker's thoughts and does not involve the abuse of testimonial warrants. The deterioration of the reliability of testimonial warrants is especially worrisome, not merely because reliable warrants backing personal revelations are the foundation of strong social and moral relationships, but because such warrants may figure among the last resorts to repair other breaches of trust. When deception or reticence are inappropriately used or when parties mistreat one another in the myriad ways of which we are capable, the apology and the truthful, detailed and direct attestation to correct the misunderstanding promulgated by deception operate as crucial remedies. If those mechanisms are sullied too, digging our way out of cynicism, distance, and distrust may prove progressively more and more infeasible.
To be sure, there are some persuasive examples involving the articulation of propositions the speaker privately rejects, such as exclamations of joy at the prospect of a dreaded reunion. These cases, when persuasive, seem however to involve standard forms of etiquette (as do many of the permissible forms of deception discussed above). Social norms of etiquette, as I argued in Chapter One, often operate in the kinds of justified suspended contexts in which we use communication to achieve purposes other than advancing propositions to be taken as true, e.g., cementing minimal commitments to social inclusion. This is publicly understood and the face-saving claims of unknown sincerity that people make within such contexts are not well-characterized as lies because, objectively understood, they are not forwarded to· be taken as true. Some false claims, made defensively, to shield one's privacy from invasive and inappropriate (however innocent) inquiries should also be understood to operate in suspended contexts and should be understood as deflections, rather than lies (at least for moral and legal purposes).
There is no gainsaying that lies may have instrumental value and that they may be used as means to further otherwise good ends. But the same might be said of many other wrong actions, of many other regulable actions, and even of other forms of recognizably regulabl~ speech. The proceeds of theft may be directed at poverty relief. Intentional defamatory speech might be used to increase the sales of newspapers whose profits all go to worthy charitable causes; fraudulent speech might be used to generate market activity and consumer confidence when the economy is faltering; incendiary speech might be used to spark violence that in turn creates effective pressure for needed government reform. So while it is undeniable that lies may be motivated by and used to further worthwhile ends, as may a range of other activities legitimately subject to legal regulation, lies are not essential to the achievement of these ends. Yet, they do inflict a unique form of damage on our ability to use communication for our most essential purposes. 64 What is at issue is not whether lies can be used to further the speaker's ends or whether they may be used to further important and significant social ends, but whether these facts bear on whether lies have significant free speech values. My contention is that because the lie does not directly participate in the values underlying freedom of speech and because its use threatens many of the substantial purposes that motivate a free speech regime, we have reason to doubt that freedom of speech demands that lies be immune from regulation. Merely showing that lies can be put to instrumentally valuable use does not dislodge that conclusion. What would have to be shown is that lies have some overarching, unique value that cannot be readily achieved through other, more benign forms of action or sincere speech. The arguments canvassed for the value of the lie fail to meet this measure.
The Level of Review
Before I conclude the discussion of freedom of speech, I want to acknowledge what many legal readers will have noticed long ago: that my analysis did not proceed by identifying and then applying the appropriate stan,;. dard of review, whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis. Nor have I suggested what standard of review should apply to regulations of deliberate falsifications. This is not because I endorse the view that lies (or false speech) fall outside the scope of the First Amendment.65 My rationale is three-fold. First, I find the standard-of-review analysis at best a highly flawed heuristic device that summarizes the conclusions of arguments that first must be made; it rarely serves as a helpful algorithm for addressing new or hard issues. Second, I am fairly skeptical of the idea that regulations on some sorts of speech fall entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment, but rather think that the usual examples are either entirely wrongheaded (e.g., the obscenity and fighting words doctrines) or better explained as cases in which First Amendment concerns are adequately answered. And third, because even were I more sympathetic to the idea that some speech regulations fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection, I am not confident legal regulations on lying would fall among them.
If, for practical purposes, I were pressed to reformulate my conclusions in terms of the appropriate standard of review, I would say the following: Because the lie as such has no free speech value, strict scrutiny seems inappropriate. The government's reasons for regulating need not be compelling to warrant their regulation. But, given the serious political and structural concerns associated with the regulation of such speech, placing such regulations outside the scope of First Amendment protection or only subjecting them to rational basis review would be inadvisable. It would fail to take those concerns sufficiently seriously. Hence, I would favor a modified version of intermediate scrutiny.
Here is the modification that I have in mind. On its face, the usual recitation of the intermediate scrutiny standard asks whether the regulation substantially furthers an important governmental interest. I have been arguing that some legal regulations of the lie would further an important government interest. But, what troubles me about the usual reading of "governmental interest" is that it focuses entirely on the adequacy of the positive rationale for regulation, e.g., whether it is important and appropriately content-neutral. What is missed by this formulation is official, structured attention to the side effects of the regulation on other mandatory governmental interests-here, whether the particular regulation in question did, in the circumstances, as applied, chill speech or serve as an avenue for governmental abuses. The idea that the concern about stifling (valuable) speech, whether through actual or perceived governmental abuse, is already factored in because some scrutiny is applied seems fanciful. Briefly, my own interpretation of intermediate scrutiny would not take for granted that where there is low value speech (in this case deliberate misrepresentations outside a justified suspended context) and the substantial furthering of an important government interest (in this case, the protection of and/or the affirmation of the significance of reliable warrants), that these facts necessarily compensate for any and all side effects on the climate for speech. I would diffidently suggest a further prong of intermediate scrutiny that expressly asked whether, on its face or as applied, the regulation overburdened (valuable) speech (or other constitutionally protected interests). That test may often be satisfied in practice.
Conclusion
I have not tried to build a decisive case for the legal regulation of lies, but rather to argue that, from a constitutional point of view, whether to grant legal impunity to the lie is not settled by the foundational commitment to freedom of speech. Free speech values are not intrinsically threatened by legal regulation of lies. Moreover, a powerful, content-neutral motive for regulation may be to protect and strengthen the effectiveness of our communicative practices and the foundations of a free speech culture.
Acknowledging this compatibility could have practical implications, such as offering grounds to simplify the burdens of proof associated with the regulation of commercial misrepresentation by shifting the evidentiary issues from how audiences were deceived or put at risk of deception to whether or not speakers believed their utterances. Casting aside the freedom of speech objection could also push our deliberation about regulation in new directions, both toward matters of regulatory design and toward the more careful consideration of what other significant values are implicated by legal regulation. In the next chapter, I take up this lat~er task with respect to regulation of the autobiographical lie. Although its regulation does not inherently encroach on the free speech interests of the thinker, I argue that other substantial values of equality and community counsel against regulation and in favor of legally accommodating this wrongful behavior.
